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Hewitt v. Kalish: Qualifying as an "Expert
Competent To Testify" Under O.C.G.A
Section 9-11-9.1

In Hewett v. Kalish,' plaintiff, Hewett, sued Kalish, a podiatrist, for
the negligent treatment of her tarsal tunnel syndrome condition.2 As
required by Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 9-11-9.1,3
plaintiff filed with her complaint the affidavit of an orthopedic surgeon,
Dr. Alan D. Davis.4 The affidavit set forth Dr. Davis' professional
credentials, his hospital affiliations, and his curriculum vitae.' The
relevant portion of the affidavit provided:
I am... competent to testify as an expert on behalf of [plaintiff] in an
action for professional malpractice arising out of the diagnosis, care
and treatment of [plaintiff] from January 1988 through March 1992.
I have personal knowledge of the facts recited in this Affidavit. My
opinions in this Affidavit are based upon my education, training and
experience in practicing orthopedics, together with my own professional
and careful examination of [plaintiff], as well as review of [her] medical
records . .
The affidavit then went on to state that in the affiant's opinion,
defendant failed to exercise the proper standard of care in the evaluation
1. 264 Ga. 183, 442 S.E.2d 233 (1994).
2. Id. at 183, 442 S.E.2d at 234. Plaintiff alleged the defendant podiatrist, Stanley
Kalish, failed to exercise the degree of care and skill generally exercised by podiatrists
while performing a posterior tibial nerve resection and epineuroplasty. Hewett v. Kalish,
210 Ga. App. 584, 584, 436 S.E.2d 710, 711 (1993). Plaintiff claimed this failure resulted
in the loss of sensation over most of the sole of her left foot. Id. at 584, 436 S.E.2d at 71112.
3. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993). O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a) provides:
In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice, the plaintiff shall be
required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify,
which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission
claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.
Id. (emphasis added).
4. 264 Ga. at 183, 442 S.E.2d at 234.
5. 210 Ga. App. at 585, 436 S.E.2d at 712.
6. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the affidavit).
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and treatment of plaintiff's tarsal tunnel syndrome and in the performance of the posterior tibial nerve resection.' The trial court dismissed
the complaint because the affidavit failed to meet the "expert competent
The court of appeals
to testify" requirements of section 9-11-9.1.
affirmed.' The court of appeals determined the issue of an expert's
competency is to be evaluated by an evidentiary standard and must be
satisfied at the pleading stage.10 The court of appeals then declared
the affidavit of Dr. Davis to be insufficient because he was from a
different professional school than defendant and the affidavit "lacked
evidence that [Dr. Davis] employed like methods of treatment as are
employed in podiatry, so as to establish the expertise necessary to state
an opinion regarding the standard of care to which the podiatrist
defendant is held."" On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. 2 The supreme court held section 9-11-9.1 simply imposes an
initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff."
In order for the
complaint in a professional malpractice action to be subject to dismissal
for failure to state a claim, the affidavit must "'disclose with certainty
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of
provable facts.'"'4
The Georgia General Assembly enacted the requirement of an expert
affidavit in a professional malpractice action in 1987.6 The purpose
behind the statute is "to prevent the filing of a professional malpractice
action without fact and opinion to support a claim and relying on
discovery to produce the necessary fact and opinion to sustain a
claim."" The goal is "to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
264 Ga. at 183, 442 S.E.2d at 234.
210 Ga. App. at 584, 436 S.E.2d at 711.
Id. at 585-86, 436 S.E.2d at 712. The court stated:

It is required that the afflant be "competent to testify," which means that the
affiant's qualification as an expert must be established at the very onset of the

lawsuit. See O.C.GA. § 24-9-67. Otherwise, the required statement setting forth
"at least one negligent act or omission ... and the factual basis for each such
claim," O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a), would be superfluous and irrelevant.

Id. at 586, 436 S.E.2d at 712.
11. 210 Ga. App. at 587, 436 S.E.2d at 713.
12. Hewett, 264 Ga. at 187, 442 S.E.2d at 236.
13. Id. at 184, 442 S.E.2d at 234.
14. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-24, 416 S.E.2d 102, 103
(1992)).
15. 1987 Ga. Laws 887 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (1993)).
16. HARDY GREGORY, JR., GEORGIA CIL PRACTICE § 3-3 (1990).
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suits being filed."'7 As a result, plaintiffs are required to bring forth
their proof at an earlier stage."8 The statute does not clarify the
meaning of the phrase "expert competent to testify."9 Rather, it has
been left to the Georgia appellate courts to give this phrase meaning in
light of the underlying purpose and goals of the statute. The traditional
rule in Georgia regarding the competency of an expert to testify in a
malpractice action when the expert is from a different professional school
than the defendant was stated by the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Sandford v. Howard.'s The court explained:
The general rule is that a member of a school of practice other than
that to which defendant belongs is not competent to testify as an
expert in a malpractice case .... [However], [w]here there is proof by
competent evidence that the methods of treatment are the same despite
the difference in the nomenclature
of the schools involved, the witness
21
is competent to testify.
This rule was reaffirmed three years later in Bethea v. Smith.' In
Bethea, plaintiff in a medical malpractice action presented the expert
affidavit of a podiatrist in opposing the summary judgment motion of
defendant orthopedic surgeon.' The court of appeals determined the
affidavit was not competent expert medical evidence.' In order to fall
within the exception to Sandford's general rule, the affiant must produce

17. 0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286,288,378 S.E.2d 708,
710 (1989).
18. GREGORY, supra note 16.
19. O.C.GA. § 9-11-9.1(a) (1993). See supra note 3.
20. 161 Ga. App. 495, 288 8.E.2d 739 (1982). This case was decided prior to the
enactment of the expert affidavit requirement of section 9-11-9.1. The defendant filed a
motion in limine to prevent the use by plaintiff of orthopedic surgeons not licensed as
podiatrists as expert witnesses on the standard of care requirement ofpodiatrists. 161 Ga.
App. at 496, 288 S.E.2d at 740.
21. Id. at 497, 288 S.E.2d at 740-41. The court went on to hold that the orthopedic
surgeons produced sufficient evidence that the methods of treatment were the same as
those employed by podiatrists, and declared them competent to testify as experts. Id. at
497, 288 S.E.2d at 741. The court stated, [I]nsofar as the human foot and leg are
concerned, a podiatrist is capable of rendering the same treatment an orthopedist may give,
short of amputation." Id. at 496, 288 S.E.2d at 740. Compare this result to the decision
reached by the court of appeals in the present case in which it was determined that the
orthopedist failed to demonstrate "that he employed like methods of treatment as are
employed in podiatry ... ." 210 Ga. App. at 587, 436 S.E.2d at 713.
22. 176 Ga. App. 467, 336 S.E.2d 295 (1985).
23. Id. at 467, 336 S.E.2d at 296. The podiatrist's affidavit declared he was familiar
with the standard of care and treatment practiced by the medical profession generally with
respect to the treatment provided to plaintiff by defendant. Id., 336 S.E.2d at 296-97.
24. Id. at 470, 336 S.E.2d at 299.
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some evidence of education, training or experience demonstrating his or
her similar expert qualifications as to the diagnosis and treatment
employed by defendant.' "Whether or not the same treatment would
ordinarily be afforded as a matter of general practice by both schools of
medicine is ... an evidentiary issue." 8 The first case in which the
court of appeals interpreted the "expert competent to testify" language
of section 9-11-9.1 was Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v. Milton.Y In Milton,
plaintiff sued Piedmont Hospital alleging medical malpractice of the
nursing staff for injuries suffered in a fall while recovering from
surgery.28 Pursuant to section 9-11-9.1, plaintiffs filed with their
complaint the affidavit of Dr. William Scabon, the doctor who performed
plaintiff's surgery prior to the fall that led to his injuries. 29 The court
of appeals held the affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of section
9-11-9.1 because it failed to demonstrate the affiant was "an expert
competent to testify" in the field of nursing.'
While not explicitly
referring to the rule established in Sandford, the court's requirement
that the affiant produce evidence of his qualifications as an expert in the
field of nursing leads to the conclusion that the court adopted Sandford
in applying the competency element of section 9-11-9.1.3' In Milligan
v. Manno, 2 the court of appeals expressly applied the rule from
Sandford to the expert affidavit requirement.' In Milligan, plaintiff
filed the affidavit of an osteopathic physician in her medical malpractice
action against an allopathic physician."4 The affiant concluded that the
defendant failed to exercise the proper standard of care, but provided no

25. Id. at 469, 336 S.E.2d at 298.

26. Id.
27. 189 Ga. App. 563, 377 S.E.2d 198 (1988).
28. Id. at 563, 377 S.E.2d at 199.
29. Id. The affidavit provided that Dr. Scabon:
performed surgery on Mr. Milton on December 15, 1986, and that after surgery
he gave defendant's nursing staff "instruction for the patient to remain [in the]
'supine position today'". Dr. Scabjon further deposed that "it was brought to his
attention that in the early morning of December 16, 1986, that Mr. Milton fell and
broke his hip while being assisted to the bathroom[;] that walking the patient to
the bathroom by a nurse or a nursing assistant was contrary to this] directions
[and that he] did not anticipate that a nurse or nursing assistant would walk the
patient to the bathroom under the instructions given."
Id. at 563-64, 377 S.E.2d at 199 (alterations in original) (quoting the affidavit).
30. Id. at 564, 377 S.E.2d at 199.
31. Id.; Sandford, 161 Ga. App. at 497,28 S.E.2d at 741; see also Belthea, 176 Ga. App.
at 469, 336 S.E.2d at 298.
32. 197 Ga. App. 171, 397 S.E.2d 713 (1990).
33. Id. at 172, 397 S.E.2d at 715.
34. Id. at 171, 397 S.E.2d at 714.
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evidence as to how the standards of care or methods of treatment of
allopaths and osteopaths overlapped." The court of appeals held the
affidavit to be insufficient under the requirements of section 9 - 1 1 -9.1."
The court of appeals stated:
Now that the law requires the affidavit of a competent expert witness
to be filed with a malpractice complaint, the rule set forth in Sandford
governing the competence of a member of one school of medical practice
to testify against a member of another school applies not only to
testimony presented at trial but also to the affidavit required to be filed
with the complaint. 7
The holding in Milligan, therefore, established that the competency of
the expert for purposes of the section 9-11-9.1 affidavit is to be evaluated
according to the same evidentiary standards used in summary judgment
proceedings and at trial.3s In Chandler v. Koenig," the court of
appeals set forth in greater detail the requirements for an affiant from
a different professional school in order to qualify as an expert for
purposes of section 9-11-9.1.' o The court of appeals stated:
[C]ompetency as an expert is not demonstrated by mere familiarity
During the course of one's education, training or experience as a
[pharmacologist], it is possible to become "familiar" with the standard
of care and treatment generally employed by [medical doctors]. Such
familiarity would not, however, qualify one as an expert in that regard.
An expert witness is one who through education, training, or experi-

35. Id.

36. Id. at 172, 397 S.E.2d at 715.
37. Id. But see 0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286,287,378
S.E.2d 708, 710 (-Nothing in the affidavit requirements in O.C.GA. § 9-11-9.1 demands
that the standard of care be set forth, that a plaintiff's expert state he is familiar with the
appropriate standard of care, or that the affiant detail the manner in which the defendant
deviated from that standard.").
38. 197 Ga. App. at 171, 397 S.E.2d at 715; see also Belthea, 176 Ga. App. at 470, 336
S.E.2d at 299 (evidentiary standard used to determine competency of expert in summary
judgment proceeding).
39. 203 Ga. App. 684, 417 S.E.2d 715 (1992).
40. Id. at 687, 417 S.E.2d at 717. The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action
against a doctor and hospital. With the complaint, plaintiff filed the affidavit of a professor
of pharmacology and toxicology. Id. at 684, 417 S.E.2d at 715. The affiant opined he was
"familiar with the standard of care required and the properties and interactions of the
drugs prescribed to [plaintiff) by [defendants]" and was "competent to testify regarding the
standards of care and recommended use' of those drugs. Id. at 687, 417 S.E.2d at 717
(quoting the affidavit).
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ence has peculiar knowledge concerning some matter of science or skill
to which his testimony relates.4'

A bare assertion of familiarity with the applicable standard of care is not
sufficient to meet the requirements of section 9-11-9.1.42 However, in
the absence of evidence of the affiant's expertise regarding defendant's
standard of care, the affidavit will still be sufficient if evidence is
produced demonstrating that the treatment is identical in the two
schools.' In Nowak v. High," the court of appeals held a registered
nurse was competent to testify, for 'purposes of the section 9-11-9.1
affidavit, in a malpractice action against a doctor who was allegedly
The affidavit
negligent in the giving of a phenergan injection. '
is usually
phenergan
injections
of
giving
provided that the practice
performed by registered nurses, but medical doctors also engage in the
practice." The affiant concluded, "I am familiar with the standard of
care exercised in the United States for the giving of injections of

phenergan, as well as the standard of care exercised in the medical
community in the United States for performing such injections."4 7 The
court of appeals held the affidavit satisfied section 9-11-9.1 because "the
affidavit itself shows that the practice of giving phenergan injections is
shared by the nursing and medical professions, and is an area in which

41. Id. at 687,417 S.E.2d at 717 (alteration in original). The court went on to state the
affidavit must set forth some evidence indicating an overlap of expert qualifications
between the differing professional schools. Id. The mere fact a pharmacologist has expert
knowledge relating to the drugs and medication does not translate into "expert knowledge
of the standard of care in the prescribing of drugs ordinarily employed throughout the
general medical profession by physicians who are years removed from the intensive
pharmacological training they received in medical school and for whom the prescribing of
drugs is but one facet of their practice." I& at 687, 417 S.E.2d at 717.
42. Id. The court indicated when the affuant and defendant are from the same
professional school, there is no need for the affiant to produce evidence of the applicable
standard of care. Id. at 685-86, 417 S.E.2d at 716-17 (citing 0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding
Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 378 S.E.2d 708 (1989)); see also HCA Health Serv. of Ga.,
Inc. v. Hampshire, 206 Ga. App. 108, 111, 424 S.E.2d 293, 296 (To qualify as an expert
competent to testify, the affiant must either be from the same professional school as
defendant or demonstrate how the methods of treatment between the two schools are the

same).
43. Nowak v. High, 209 Ga. App. 536, 433 S.E.2d 602 (1993); see also Tye v. Wilson,

208 Ga. App. 253, 254, 430 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1993).
44. 209 Ga. App. 536, 433 S.E.2d 602.
45. Id. at 536, 433 S.E.2d at 603.
46. Id.

47. Id. The allegation of negligence in the affidavit was that the doctor gave the
injection in an area of the patient's hip of high nerve density. Id.
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the professions overlap.' s As the above decisions illustrate, the court
of appeals firmly embraced the concept of evaluating the competency of
a section 9-11-9.1 afflant by an evidentiary standard requiring some
proof of the expert's qualifications as to the treatment employed by the
defendant. 4 '
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and decided the
competency of an expert for purposes of section 9-11-9.1 should be
evaluated by a pleading rather than an evidentiary standard."
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Sears-Collins first discussed the
presumption in favor of plaintiff at the motion to dismiss stage. 51 The
opinion stated:
"[Al section 9-11-9.1 affidavit should be construed most favorably to the
plaintiff and all doubts should be resolved in plaintiff's favor, even if
an unfavorable construction of the affidavit may be possible" so long as

such construction does not detract from the purpose of section 9-11-9.1
of reducing the number of frivolous malpractice suits."2
The supreme court then stated a section 9-11-9.1 affidavit could properly
contain conclusions.'
According to the court, the application of
pleading rules to the question of competency will not detract from the
statute's purpose "of reducing the number of frivolous malpractice suits
being filed for two reasons."5' First, a complaint that satisfies the
application of pleading rules is not likely to be frivolous.' Second, a
defendant who believes, a plaintiff's expert to be incompetent despite the
48. Id. at 539, 433 S.E.2d at 605. See also Avret v. McCormick, 246 Ga. 401, 271
S.E,2d 832 (1980) (nurse qualified as expert witness concerning reasonable care in
sterilization of needle used to draw blood because the drawing of blood is not exclusively
within the professional skills of medical doctors); Tye v. Wilson, 208 Ga. App. 253,254,430
S.E.2d 129, 130 (1993) (doctor is competent to give affidavit against nurse in malpractice
action involving the care of postoperative, intubated patient).
49. Hewett, 210 Ga. App. at 585-86, 436 S.E.2d at 712.
50. Hewett, 264 Ga. at 184, 442 S.E.2d at 234.
51. I& The court stated:
Mhe sufficiency of the affidavit determines whether a plaintiffs action is subject
to dismissal under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b) (6); and that for a complaint to be subject
to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the affidavit must "disclose with certainty
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts."
Id (quoting Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-24, 416 S.E.2d 102, 103 (1992)).
52. 264 Ga. at 184, 442 S.E.2d at 243 (quoting Gadd v. Wilson & Co., 262 Ga. 234,235,
416 S.E.2d 285, 286 (1992)). The court noted neither Bowen nor Gadd dealt with the
competency of the afflant, but indicated there was no reason why stricter standard should
govern the competency question. Id.
53. Id. (citing Ledford v. Meyer, 249 Ga. 407, 290 S.E.2d 908 (1982)).
54. Id., 442 S.E.2d at 234-35.
55. Id., 442 S.E.2d at 235.
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application of pleading rules would be able to resolve the question at a
hearing under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-12(d).' The supreme court then
applied the pleading rules to the affidavit filed by plaintiff.57 The rule
allowing pleadings to contain conclusions combined with the similarity
between podiatry and orthopedics led the court to conclude the affiant's
statement regarding his competency satisfied the requirements of section
9- 1 1 -9.1.s The court concluded:
Because in many factual situations an orthopedist and a podiatrist will

overlap in their medical treatment of the foot, rendering an orthopedist
competent to testify against the podiatrist, and because Hewitt's
complaint does not disclose with certainty that such is not the case
here, Hewitt's complaint should not have been dismissed."
The result of the supreme court's
plaintiff's expert will be presumed
otherwise.'o This holding is likely
appellate litigation, at least with

decision is that the competency of
until defendant can demonstrate
to reduce the growing amount of
respect to competency of expert

56. Id. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(d) (1993) states:
The defenses specifically enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection
(b) of this Code section, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion
for judgment mentioned in subsection (c) of this Code section shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party unless the court order that the
hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
The court then outlined how such a hearing would proceed:
The defendant must raise his or her 12(bX6) defense by motion or in his or her
answer, § 9-11-12(b), and then apply for the necessary hearing under § 9-11-12(d).
At that hearing, the defendant must present evidence that the defendant contends
shows that the plaintiffs expert is not in fact competent to testify. By presenting
matters outside the pleadings, the 12(d) hearing must be treated as one for
summary judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment rules of notice must be met,
and the plaintiff "shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Code Section 9-11-56," § 9-11-12(b). If the
defendant pierces the plaintiffs pleading affidavit on the issue of competency by
offering evidence that the defendant's professional school and the plaintiffs school
do not overlap with regard to the method of treatment in question, and the
plaintiff offers no further evidence that his or her expert is competent to testify,
the trial court would be authorized to grant summary judgment to the defendant.
264 Ga. at 184-85, 442 S.E.2d at 235 (citations omitted).
57. 264 Ga. at 186, 442 S.E.2d at 236.
58. Id. The court noted the "only reason a podiatrist does not hold a full medical
license.., is that the practice of medicine is not limited to any one area of the body." Id.
59. Id. at 186-87, 442 S.E.2d at 236 (citations omitted).
60. See id. See also Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 123-24, 416 S.E.2d 102, 103
(1992); Gadd v. Wilson & Co., 262 Ga. 234, 235, 416 S.E.2d 285, 286 (1992).
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witnesses, concerning section 9_11_9.1.61 In this regard, it is likely to
be seen as a favorable decision.' Judges and commentators alike have
expressed frustration over the application of section 9-11-9.1.6 "Five
years of surveying section 9.1 cases have forced these writers to the
conclusion that the Code section is a useless, self-defeating mess." As
Judge Johnson observed:
Intended to prevent frivolous litigation and all the costs inherent
therein for both litigants'and courts, this rule has instead caused more
litigation. Rather than dealing at the summary judgment stage with
the issues the legislature intended to solve, we have added a new layer
of litigation at the motion to dismiss stage .... Sadly, in the effort to
bring some order and predictability to this area of the law, it appears
that we have made matters worse.'
By assuming the competency of plaintiff's expert and requiring the
defendant to challenge the competency of the expert at a summary
judgment proceeding, the supreme court's decision adds predictability
and removes a layer of litigation in competency questions." However,
it is unclear whether this decision will fulfill the purpose behind the
statute and result in the reduction of frivolous malpractice suits being
filed. 7 The rule adopted by the court of appeals required plaintiff to
either: 1) file an affidavit of an expert from the same professional school
as defendant;" or 2) provide in the affidavit some proof of an overlap
in qualifications. 9 The decision of the supreme court again moves back
the time "when a plaintiff must come forward with his proof."7" While
the facts of Hewett demonstrate a close relationship between the two
professional schools involved,71 the breadth of the court's holding is
likely to lead to the application of pleading rules in cases involving

61. See Cynthia Trimboli Adams & Charles R. Adams, III, Torts, 45 MERCER L. REv.
403, 418 (1993).
62. See id.
63. See id. See also Tye v. Wilson, 208 Ga. App. 253, 256-57, 430 S.E.2d 129, 132
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
64. Adams & Adams, supra note 61.
65. Tye, 208 Ga. App. at 256, 430 S.E.2d at 132 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
66. Hewett, 264, Ga. at 184-85, 442 S.E.2d at 235.
67. See 0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. at 288, 378 at 710.
68. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 378 S.E.2d 708 (1989).
69. Milligan, 197 Ga. App. at 172, 397 S.E.2d at 715.
70. GREGORY, supra note 16.
71. Hewett, 264 Ga. at 186, 442 S.E.2d at 236.

1546

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

professional
schools with far less in common than orthopedics and
72
podiatry

RicHARD T. HfLLS

72. See Nowak, 209 Ga. App. at 537-38, 433 S.E.2d at 604; Tye, 208 Ga. App. at 255,
430 S.E.2d at 131; Chandler,203 Ga. App. at 687, 417 S.E.2d at 717-18.

